Taqlid and closing the doors of Ijtihād

Introduction

In this article we examine the veracity of thee claim that the doors of Ijtihād were closed. First let us define Ijtihād. It is “The total expenditure of effort made by a jurist in order to infer, with a degree of probability, the rules of the sharī’ah from their detailed evidences in the sources“. It has also been defined as:

“The effort made by the mujtahid in seeking knowledge of the ahkam (rules) of the sharī’ah through interpretation.”

Conditions for ijtihad

Both these definitions exclude the layman from practicing ijtihād. Scholars have laid down stringent conditions for the mujtahid. These include knowledge of the following:

Arabic language,
legal texts of the Qur’ān,
ḥadīth and the science of ḥadīth,
ijmā,
qiyās
maqaṣid al-sharī’ah.

Ijtihād is limited to the practical rules of the Sharī’ah. ie the regulations regarding acts of Ibaadah, as well as the muamalat (e.g. marriage and trade). Issues of belief are not subject to ijtihād.

The start of ijtihad

Islam clearly sanctions Ijtihād. The Prophet (salahu alaihi wa sallam). said: “When a judge exercises ijtihād and gives a right judgement, he will have two rewards, but if he errs in his judgement, he will still have one reward[1]”

The process of ijtihād began in the time of the Prophet (salahu alaihi wa sallam). He performed ijtihād on a number of issues, including taking ransom from the captives of Badr. That the latter was the ijtihād of the Prophet and not wahy, is borne out by Allah’s rebuke of the Prophet for this decision. [2]. This shows that the Prophet’s ijtihād did not always guarantee a correct result. If the Prophet, being the most knowledgeable regarding religious matters, was unable to guarantee, in every case, a correct result from his ijtihād, then it follows that those who came after him were even less likely to guarantee that their ijtihād was correct. However in the case of the Prophet (salahu alaihi wa sallam) any mistake would inevitably be corrected by Allah. In addition, these mistakes were in reality very few and far between.

He (salahu alaihi wa sallam) encouraged his Companions to make ijtihād in particular situations. For example, he delegated the decision regarding the fate of the Jewish tribe, Banu Qurayzah to Sa’d ibn Mu’ād. He also acknowledged the decision of Amr bin Al ‘As to perform tayammum when in a state of janāba due to the intense coldness of the water. Ibn Masood would say after giving a ruling: “I am giving my opinion about her. If it is correct, then it is from Allah, but if it is incorrect, then it is from me and Satan.”

Ijithad after the death of the Prophet

After the death of the Prophet, the Islamic empire expanded rapidly, and with it came a host of issues which were not specifically covered by the Sharī’ah. The Companions appointed Abū Bakr as Caliph based upon an analogy with his appointment by the Prophet to lead the people in prayer. If his leadership in religious affairs were sanctioned by the Prophet, then his leadership in worldly affairs had even more right to be accepted. Abū Bakr’s war against the non-payers of zakat, and the collection of the Qur’an in one mushāf were based on his ijtihād. Likewise, ‘Umar’s suspension of hadd for theft during drought and his suspension of giving zakat to the ‘mu’allafat al qulūb [3]’ were all based on ijtihād.

The likelihood of mistakes in ijtihād of the first two rightly guided caliphs was very small. Whenever the caliph could not find a solution to a problem in the text, he would gather together the major companions, many of whom had been forbidden from leaving Madinah for this very purpose, to arrive at a solution. If there was unanimity, it was known as ijmā‘. Hence ijtihād that led to an ijmā‘ was free from the possibility of error. However when no unanimity was reached, the Caliph would make his own ijtihād binding, which then became law.

The Caliphs encouraged their governors to exercise ijtihād if they failed to find an answer in the Qur’ān or Sunnah. In his letter to Abū Mūsā’ al-Ash’arī, ‘Umar al Khattaab said:

“Try to understand matters that perplex you and for which you do not find explicit instructions in the Qur’ān or Sunnah of the Prophet. Acknowledge precedents and similar cases and apply analogy to them, and take the decision which is most pleasing to Allah and most corresponding to justice so far as you see”.

Some reasons why scholars differed in their ijtihād

There are a number of reasons why rules arrived at by means of ijtihād will differ. A word in the Qur’ān or Sunnah may take more than one literal meaning. For example the word ‘qur’ in the verse ‘divorced women should wait three quroo’, can mean ‘menses’ as well as the ‘purity between menses’. Scholars have hence differed as to when the divorce becomes finalised due to their differing in the understanding of the word ‘qur’.

Some words in the Qur’ān can have both literal and figurative meanings. The Qur’ān orders those who have ‘touched’ women to renew their ablution. The word touch (lams) can literally mean touching by the hand. It can also have the figurative meaning of sexual intercourse. The jurists differed in their interpretation and hence differed in their ruling of the necessity of ablution for a man who literally touches a woman.

Decisive or Probable?

With regards to the verse that is ‘amm [4], the Hanafis considered it to be qat’̣ī [5] , whereas the other three madāhibs considered it to be ẓannī [6]. In the event of an ‘amm verse conflicting with the khāṣṣ, the jamhūr [7] would use the latter to specify the former.

For example the ḥadīth, ‘Whatever is watered from the sky is subject to charity’ is ‘amm. However, another ḥadīth states: ‘There is no charity on less than five awsaq‘ (a measure of weight) which is khāṣṣ [8]. The jamhūr (majority) would specify the first ḥadīth with the second, resulting in the ruling that zakat is payable on whatever is watered from the sky, provided that the amount is more than five awsaq. However the Hanifis state that the ‘amm ḥadīth, being of later origin, abrogates the ‘khāṣs, and therefore there is no nisab on zakat on agricultural produce. Hence, due to different methodologies in reconciling apparently conflicting textual evidence, jurists arrived at different rulings on the same issue.

Access to hadith

When making ijtihād on a new issue, the jurists would always first look into the Qur’ān and Sunnah. If nothing was found in these texts, they would look to see if an ijmā‘ existed on the issue. Failing this, they would employ qiyās. With regards to the primary sources however, jurists did not always have access to the all of the ḥadīth pertinent to the issue. For example, Abū Ḥanīfa ruled that there was no congregational prayer for rain, as he was not aware of the relevant ḥadīth.

In some cases, the jurists were aware of the ḥadīth, but due to their different criteria for the acceptability of ḥadīth. Some jurists would use it as a basis for their ijtihad, whereas others would reject it. This led to different rulings on the same issue. Mālik would reject any ḥadīth that conflicted with the customs of the people of Madina, Abū Ḥanīfa stipulated that the ḥadīth had to be mashoor [9]. Shāfi’ī rejected most mursal [10] ḥadīth, whereas Ahmed bin Hanbal accepted them.

With regarding to the secondary sources of the sharī’ah, jurists differed on which principles were admissible in making rulings. Shāfi’ī rejected the use of istịhsān [11] (used by the Hanafis), and the custom of the people of Madinah. Jurists also differed on the validity of ijmā‘ after the Companions.

Forbiddence of Taqlid

The view of Imaam Shāfi’ī

Imaam Shāfi’ī states in his Risalah that “[knowledge obtained through ijtihād] is binding only on the one who exercised qiyās[12] and not on other men of knowledge”. Shāfi’ī states further that the scholar is only bound by his own ijtihād, and that he may not abandon that which he considers to be true in order to blindly follow another scholar. (Al-Umm) This statement is in direct contradiction to those who state that it is binding upon a person to follow one scholar in all matters of the religion. When a scholar makes a ijtihād, he is either right or wrong. If he is right then he has correctly interpreted the will of the Law Giver. If he is wrong in his ijtihād, he has (inadvertently) contradicted the will of the Law Giver, although he still receives one reward for his sincere ijtihād.

The view of Taqi-ud-Deen Subki

If one believes that the ijtihād of a scholar contradicts textual evidence, then he has no choice but to follow the clear textual evidence, irrespective of the status of this scholar. In other words, he follows the One who never errs; Allah (and His Messenger). To do otherwise would be to abandon the infallible sayings of Allah and His Messenger in favour of one who is fallible. Taqi-ud-Deen Subki said: “For me, the best thing is to follow the ḥadīth. A person should imagine himself in front of the Prophet just having heard it from him, would there be leeway for him to delay acting on it? No by Allah!” Taqi-ud-Deen Ibn Taymiyyah said that following one Imām in all that he says is tantamount to associating partners with Allah in the Sharī’ah.

The first three generations

No-one from the first three generations considered the statement of a single man to be binding unless it agreed with the truth. Shah Waliullah states that blind following began in the fourth century of Islam. Thus in the first three generations of Muslims whom the Messenger of Allah described as the best of people, blind following was unknown[13]. Shanqīti stated that after the death of the Prophet the laymen would ask a knowledgeable companion for a ruling without specifying anyone in particular. If a new situation arose, he would not necessarily go back to the original companion. Instead he would ask whoever he wished from the knowledgeable companions. In other words, he would ask one mufti on one occasion, and another mufti on a different occasion. The notion of just restricting oneself to one mufti did not exist in the first three generations. Hence a ruling arrived at by ijtihād is not binding on anyone other than those who consider them to be the truth.

Were the Gates of Ijtihād Closed?

It is a common belief among many Muslims that the gates of ijtihād were closed at the end of the third century. However ijtihād clearly continued well after the end of the third century. Until the sixth century, there was no mention in the book of usul al fiqh about the closure of the gates of ijtihād. As we shall show, the alleged closure of gates of ijtihād was a fallacy; it never occurred.

Ijtihād in the Fourth Century

According to Subki, a number of fourth century scholars including Ibn Surayj, Tabari, Ibn Khuzayma, and Ibn Mundhir were mujtahids who differed on many issues with the Shāfi’ī school. Tabari (d310) even founded his own madhab.

Abū Ḥasan al-Dariki (d375) differed substantially from the Shāfi’ī school, often making rulings that differed from both Shāfi’ī and Abū Ḥanīfa. Hence we have five scholars, (mentioned above) who exercised ijtihād, after the alleged closure of the gates of ijtihād.

Ijtihād in the Fifth Century

In the fifth century, a number of scholars condemned taqlīd and hence implicitly supported the use of ijtihād. For example Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (d. 463) wrote an entire chapter in refutation of taqlīd. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi and Juwayni (d. 478) considered the ability to perform ijtihād as an essential requirement for the head of state to be able to discharge is duties effectively. In the event of his inability to perform ijtihād, Juwayni suggested that the task be delegated to the jurists.

Likewise, al-Mawardi (d450) considered it essential that the mufti and the qāḍī be able to perform ijtihād. Juwayni is described by Subki as someone who uses his own independent reasoning and ijtihād as opposed to following the principles of Shāfi’ī. Hence it is clear that ijtihād was flourishing in the fifth century. Many scholars, although not all, ascribed themselves to a madhab, however a number of scholars did not restrict themselves to the principles of their madhab.

Later centuries

As well as ijtihād in fiqh, many scholars who came in the later centuries made important contributions to the development of the legal principles of their madhab. Ibn Qudama, a seventh century jurist, made important contributions to the development of Hanbali fiqh. Likewise Sarakhsi (d. 490) contributed original material to Hanafi thought. The belief that the founder of each of the four madhabs developed all of the legal principles of their madhab and that later scholars based all of their legal decisions on the basis of these founding principles, does not stand up to historical reality. The madhab of Imām Ahmed for example was developed by Abū Bakr al-Khallāl and some of his contemporaries.

Now that we have established that the gates of ijtihād did not close at the end of the third century, and that ijtihād flourished in the fourth and fifth centuries, we examine the question: did the gates of ijtihād close at a later period?

Ijtihad and the Mujtahid

The discussion of the closing of the gates of ijtihād is inextricably linked with the discussion regarding the possibility of the extinction of mujtahids. For if there were no mujtahids, there would be no ijtihād. This discussion concerning the possible extinction of mujtahids was first raised by Ibn Aqil and then his opponent Amidi (d. 632). Initially it was a theological rather than a juristic discussion. However, the term mujtahid has more than one meaning. When al-Rafi’i concluded that Muslims “seemed to agree” there were no mujtahids in his era, it is likely that he was referring to what is known as mujtahid mutlaq – or an independent founder of a school of law. Up to the end of the eighth century, other similar claims regarding the absence of mujtahids were vague, and did not imply ijma‘on the issue. Jalaluddin Al-Suyuti’s (d 911) claim that he was a mujtahid, shows that ijtihād continued into the tenth century

The Mujaddid Quandary

The proponents of ‘closing the gates’ had another problem. They were unable to reconcile the following ḥadīth regarding the appearance of a mujaddid [14] Allaah’s Messenger, sallallaahu alaihi wa sallam,said, “Allaah will raise for this Ummah at the head of every hundred years, he/those who will revive its religion for it.” Thus a mujaddid would appear at the head of every century. And he by default had to be a mujtahid. It is impossible to reconcile this hadith with their belief of disappearance of mujtahids.

Mujtahids claiming that mujtahids no longer exist!

The tenth century and after saw a decline in the number of jurists exercising ijtihād. The seven fold categories of jurists, in which the latter four categories were all muqallids, was rigorously promoted by Hanafis to argue their view that mujtahids were now extinct. This claim was strongly denied by the Hanbalis and many Shāfi’ī’s – hence there was no ijmā‘ on the alleged closure of the gates of ijtihād. Such an ijmā‘, even if it was to occur within only the Hanafi madhab, is still problematic given that ijmā‘ is defined as the consensus of the mujtahids of the time. Now would the mujtahids of a particular era all agree that there were no more mujtahids left?

Subsequent centuries saw a number of scholars strongly condemning taqlīd, and re-affirming the existence of ijtihād. Such scholars included Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d1202) and Shawkaani (d1255).

Conclusion

Hence we can conclude that the closing of the gates of ijtihād was a pure fiction. No evidence has ever been presented as to the exact date when the scholars agreed to the closure of the gate, nor have the names of the scholars who agreed to close the gate ever been mentioned.

Misconceptions